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Abstract  
Distinct policy options are typically characterised by a number of advantages (or ‘opportunities’) 
and disadvantages (or ‘threats’). The preference for one option over another depends on how 
individuals within an organisation perceive these opportunities and threats. In this article, we 
argue that individuals’ identification with an organisation’s core aims and objectives constitutes 
a key determinant of this perception. We propose that stronger identification shifts individuals’ 
attention towards potential threats rather than opportunities in the payoff distribution, 
encouraging avoidance of negative outcomes. Moreover, we argue that this ‘prevention focus’ 
in individuals’ motivational basis will be stronger under negative than under positive selection 
strategies. An original survey experiment with civil servants in the European Parliament finds 
significant evidence supporting the empirical implications of our argument. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The advantages and disadvantages of distinct policy options generally become the subject of 
extensive deliberation and negotiation in both the private and public sector. The outcome of 
such negotiations and the implementation of the ensuing decisions determine the success or 
failure of an organisation. While the advantages of a given policy option can be viewed as 
‘opportunities’ to reach favourable outcomes (e.g. high profit in the private sector, attaining 
educational or social welfare targets in the public or non-profit sector, …), the disadvantages 
can be perceived as possible ‘threats’ to the organisation and its goals. A large literature has 
highlighted the role of such threat and opportunity perceptions in a variety of contexts (Jackson 
and Dutton 1988; and references therein). Yet, a critical subsequent question has received much 
less attention: What makes someone more or less likely to focus on either opportunities or 
threats in distinct policy proposals?1 Identifying the drivers of such opportunity–vs.–threat 
perceptions is critical to our understanding of the policy preferences of political actors, and lies 
at the heart of our analysis. 
 
We specifically focus on the role of individuals’ identification with, and dedication to, an 
organisation’s core aims and objectives – which constitutes a central element of organisational 
identification (Hall et al. 1970; Ashforth and Mael 1989; Scott and Lane 2000). Individuals’ 
organisational identification has been linked to outcomes including job satisfaction, individual 
well-being, and risk preferences. Building on motivation theory (Atkinson 1957; Atkinson et 
al. 1960; Lopes 1984, 1987) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), we argue that 
a stronger identification of individuals with their organisation’s goals also strengthens their 
motivation to avoid a policy failure. It particularly generates a ‘prevention focus’, and shifts 
                                                          
1  Partial exceptions include Mohammed and Billings (2002) and Xie and Wang (2003), who highlight the 
importance of individuals’ self-efficacy beliefs, and the balance between achievement and avoidance motivation, 
respectively. 
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individuals’ relative attention towards potential threats rather than opportunities in the payoff 
distribution. As such, it shifts preferences towards options avoiding negative outcomes during 
policy decisions. This has, to the best of our knowledge, not previously been tested, and 
constitutes the first central novelty of our article. 
 
The second contribution of our article lies in assessing the role of the choice framework as a 
potential moderator of this shift. We maintain that an identification-driven shift in focal point 
towards threat avoidance is likely to arise predominantly for individuals whose (externally 
imposed) selection strategy consists of rejecting a least preferred option rather than choosing a 
preferred option. Evidence shows that a decision-maker’s commitment to a selected option is 
at least partially dependent on the characteristics of the selection strategy used; i.e. on choosing 
or rejecting options (Shafir 1993; Ganzach 1995; Melloy and Russo 2004). Positive selection 
strategies require an individual to make a firm commitment to one option, whereas negative 
strategies merely invite the acceptance of the least-bad option (Ganzach 1995). When faced 
with distinct policy options, we argue that any inherent lack of commitment within different 
selection strategies can be compensated at least in part by individuals’ identification with an 
organisation’s core aims and objectives. The additional ‘prevention focus’ that a stronger 
identification generates thus is likely to matter most under negative selection strategies, where 
individuals’ commitment to their preferred alternative is lower. 
 
Our empirical analysis of these theoretical propositions is based on an online survey-experiment 
among civil servants within the European Parliament (i.e. ‘Administrators’ responsible for 
information preparation and dissemination; N=69). Such data obtained from public officials 
rather than students substantially benefit the external validity of our study (Druckman and Kam 
2011; Cappelen et al. 2015; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017). Furthermore, the European 
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Parliament’s administration constitutes a particularly interesting setting for two reasons. First, 
these officials play an important role in the internal decision-making process within the 
European Parliament (Neunreither 2002; Neuhold and Radulova 2006; Winzen 2011; Neuhold 
and Dobbels 2015). Much like Administrators in the European Commission, they have the 
ability to influence policy decisions through the exploitation of bureaucratic discretion (Pollack 
2003; Olsen 2006; Schafer 2014) and by providing substantive guidance and support to 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and other stakeholders (Egeberg et al. 2013). 
This makes them of central relevance to our study. Second, the European Parliament’s staff is 
subject to a regular rotational system, which makes it difficult for them to develop vested 
interests in certain policy areas or strong (and potentially problematic) personal ties with the 
stakeholders involved. Any political bias that could be expected from, for instance, politicians 
(such as MEPs) is thus likely to be largely absent among our respondents.  
 
We present our respondents with hypothetical, but realistic, policy scenarios, and provide two 
possible policy options under each scenario. The options are manipulated to reflect different 
valences, whereby one option presents simultaneously more threats and opportunities than the 
other (for a similar approach, see, Shafir 1993; Ganzach 1995; Meloy and Russo 2004). 
Participants express their preferences for one option in each scenario either under a positive or 
a negative selection framework. In the former, they choose their preferred option (henceforth 
‘choice frame’), whereas they reject their least favourite option in the negative framework 
(henceforth ‘reject frame’). We analyse how the selections depend on respondents’ level of 
identification with organisational goals. 
 
Our main findings indicate that stronger identification with organisational goals is associated 
with higher levels of threat aversion in individuals’ policy preferences. This is consistent with 
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the idea that such identification induces a ‘prevention focus’, and shifts people towards avoiding 
policy features that may endanger the organisation’s success. Furthermore, the effect of stronger 
identification is particularly relevant in a setting where respondents reject a least preferred 
option (rather than choose a preferred option). This corroborates the idea that individuals’ 
stronger identification with organisational goals can compensate for lower feelings of 
commitment or responsibility for the final selection when rejecting one of two options (which 
need not imply a strong commitment for the remaining option). Both findings are robust to the 
exact operationalisation of individuals’ identification with organisational goals.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
An organisational identity can be defined as ‘a collectively held frame within which 
organizational participants make sense of their world’ (Scott and Lane 2000, p.43). The extent 
to which individuals identify with, and are dedicated to, an organisation’s goals constitutes a 
central element of such organisational identities (Hall et al. 1970; Ashforth and Mael 1989; 
Scott and Lane 2000). Such identities and (the extent of) individuals’ organisational 
identification are known to have important implications for individuals’ preferences and 
behaviour. 2  For instance, psychological processes inducing the internalisation of the 
organisation’s aims and goals strengthen individuals’ motivation to reach group goals (Kramer 
and Brewer 1984; Ashforth and Mael 1989; Dutton et al. 1994), and make them more likely to 
take decisions benefiting the interests of the organisation even in the absence of direct 
supervision (Simon 1976). Furthermore, the extent of individuals’ identification with the 
organisation and its goals ‘systematically affects individuals’ perceptions of issues’ (Dutton 
and Penner 1993, p.90). It ‘shape[s] interpretive predispositions that focus attention on some 
                                                          
2 Space constraints prevent a deeper reflection on why people identify with their organisation, when they are most 
likely to do so, and how such identification occurs. We refer the interested reader to Pratt et al. (2016) for in-
depth discussions of these issues as well as more critical perspectives on organisational identity. 
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information and issues and exclude others’ (Gioia and Thomas 1996, p.372). Based on these 
findings, it can be expected that individuals identifying more strongly with an organisation and 
its core aims and objectives will look differently at the advantages (or ‘opportunities’) and 
disadvantages (or ‘threats’) embedded in distinct policy options. 
 
This proposition can be grounded in motivation theory (Atkinson 1957; Atkinson et al. 1960; 
Lopes 1984, 1987), which maintains that individuals’ motivation for action is determined by 
both a desire for success (the achievement motive) and a fear of failure (the avoidance motive). 
The relative strength of these counter-directional motivational tendencies governs individual-
level preferences and decision-making in any given situation. They guide individuals’ attention 
between the good and bad elements in a payoff distribution: achievement motives induce a 
focus on opportunities, whereas avoidance motives prompt a focus on threats.  
 
Importantly, as argued by Lopes (1984, 1987), situational as well as individual dispositions 
determine whether people award more or less attention to good or bad outcomes (or, phrased 
differently, whether achievement or avoidance motives take the upper hand). In our view, 
individuals’ identification with an organisations’ core aims and objectives constitutes a key 
individual-level determinant of this shift in focus. It not only instils a desire to achieve the best 
possible outcome for the organisation (Kramer and Brewer 1984; Ashforth and Mael 1989; 
Dutton et al. 1994), but also prompts people to view policy issues through organisation-
coloured lenses (Dutton and Penner 1993; Gioia and Thomas 1996). It focuses individuals’ 
attention on what is best – or least bad – for the organisation.  
 
Evidently, this implies that individuals’ preferences depend on the discrepancy between their 
valuations of distinct policy proposals. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory – and 
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the extensive empirical evidence in its favour – shows that preferences are based on a 
comparison of the expected outcome of a decision against a subjective reference point. Losses 
thereby loom larger than gains: the decrease in valuation from a prospect below the reference 
point is larger than the increase in valuation that a positive prospect of equivalent magnitude 
would bring (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). With ‘losses and 
disadvantages hav[ing] greater impact on preferences than gains and advantages’ (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991, p. 1039), the reaction to losses to the organisation will be intensified for an 
individual who identifies strongly with its core aims and objectives. These individuals’ motive 
to avoid a failure is strengthened relative to the motive for achieving a success; they develop 
what we call a ‘prevention focus’.3 For an individual with a low level of identification with the 
organisation, however, any reference point may instead be largely independent from the 
organisation’s success or failure. Discrepancy in the valuation of positive or negative prospects 
for the organisation should thus only have limited influence on their preferences. This 
discussion leads to our first testable proposition: 
 
H1: A stronger identification with an organisation and its goals is associated with a 
threat-averse selection of policy options. 
 
Selection can in principle involve a positive strategy (i.e. choosing a preferred option) or a 
negative strategy (i.e. rejecting a least preferred option). These characteristics of the selection 
strategy can have an important effect on individuals. Shafir (1993), for instance, argues that 
                                                          
3 Recent (experimental) work on citizens’ and politicians’ responses to performance information likewise shows 
that especially information about negative performance induces stronger causal attribution of responsibility 
(Olsen 2015; Nielsen and Moynihan 2016). This ‘negativity bias’ has been argued to provide bureaucrats with 
an incentive to ‘follow a mini-max strategy and be more concerned with avoiding bad performances than with 
striving for excellence’ (Olsen 2015, p.2; Hood and Dixon 2010). In line with our argument, negativity bias 
among citizens and politicians reflects one potential micro-foundation for bureaucrats’ motivation to avoid a 
policy failure. 
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such inconsistency with the invariance axiom of rational choice theory 4  arises because 
individuals put more weight on the relevant advantages of a particular option when formulating 
reasons to choose it and on its disadvantages when formulating reasons to reject it (see also 
Meloy and Russo 2004). Ganzach (1995) instead maintains that selection strategies matter 
because people feel more committed to, or responsible for, their selected options under a choice 
frame, and therefore adjust their evaluation of available alternatives. The underlying idea is that 
a direct rejection of something does not necessarily imply a firm commitment for the remaining 
option; rather, it could be seen as a choice ‘by default’. That is, ‘[o]ne has to live with the 
alternative [one] accepts, but not with the alternative [one] rejects’ (Ganzach 1995, p.115). This 
argument would imply that more weight will be put on the relevant disadvantages of available 
options when formulating reasons for choosing one of them.  
 
The above reasoning has immediate implications for the effect of individuals’ organisational 
identification on the selection process. Specifically, when one’s selection under a choice 
strategy is already based on screening for potential negative outcomes, any additional 
‘prevention focus’ generated by stronger identification might not matter so much anymore. One 
could think of this as a ceiling effect induced by high commitment under a positive selection 
strategy: One cannot avoid an undesirable option more than by not selecting it. The ‘prevention 
focus’ arising from individuals’ organisational identification will, however, still have an effect 
under the negative selection strategy. Since the inherent commitment to the selected option is 
lower in this case, no ceiling effect will arise. The direct empirical implication is that stronger 
identification with an organisations’ goals reinforces individuals’ motive to avoid a failure 
predominantly in a negative selection framework – but is likely to have a much weaker 
influence in a positive selection framework.  
                                                          
4 The invariance axiom states that different descriptions of, or approaches to, a given decision problem should not 
induce different preferences (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). 
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H2: Individuals’ identification with an organisation and its goals affects their choices 
more under negative than under positive selection frameworks. 
 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
To test our hypotheses, we ran a survey experiment with public officials in the European 
Parliament during the spring of 2015. In this section, we discuss, in turn, our case selection, the 
research design, and our empirical methodology. 
 
Case selection 
We study civil servants (‘Administrators’) working in the secretariat of the European 
Parliament, who play a central role in the preparation and dissemination of information 
throughout the Parliament’s decision-making process. Within this secretariat, we focus on 
officials working in the Committee secretariats and information support units (i.e. policy 
departments). The reason is that these officials’ work is linked most directly to the legislative 
process, making them of central relevance to our study. 
 
The secretariats are organised around the Committees of the European Parliament, of which 
each deals with a specific set of policy areas: for instance, the Committees on Employment and 
Social Affairs (EMPL), Regional Development (REGI), Transport and Tourism (TRAN), etc. 
The majority of administrative staff works for one Committee at a time and follows a limited 
number of dossiers over the entire course of the legislative process. They coordinate intra- and 
inter-institutional meetings, act as liaison between the rapporteurs and the Commission and 
Council, and provide, for instance, background statistics and analyses, forecasts, policy 
briefings, and other information. Consequently, Administrators are often in direct contact with 
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MEPs and other stakeholders, and provide technical and substantive guidance to them (Egeberg 
et al. 2013).5 Although the power of Administrators within the European Parliament may be 
limited by the role of the hierarchy within the institution (Winzen 2011), their ability to exploit 
bureaucratic discretion nonetheless provides a non-negligible influence in the policy-making 
process (Pollack 2003; Olsen 2006; Schafer 2014). Several studies have shown that this allows 
them to impact (the early stages of) the Parliament’s internal decision-making process 
(Neunreither 2002; Neuhold and Radulova 2006; Winzen 2011; Neuhold and Dobbels 2015). 
In this capacity, they might affect the content of subsequent policy decisions also by pre-
selecting available options based on their feasibility and potential outcomes. Such influence is 
most likely to occur in internal deliberations and non-formal interactions with, for instance, 
rapporteurs, rather than at later stages when proposals and amendments have already been 
formalised and passed onto political debate. The selection frame applied to such considerations 
may depend on the precise circumstances surrounding the issue and the involved stakeholders.6  
 
A focus on the European Parliament offers advantages on at least three other counts. First, as 
mentioned above, its staff is subject to a regular internal rotation system in which individuals 
generally change position every three to six years. By undermining the development of strong 
vested interests and/or personal ties in any given policy area, this implies that political bias is 
likely to be weaker among our respondents (compared to, for instance, politicians). Second, 
                                                          
5 We do not include ‘Assistant’-level staff. Their typical tasks are more of an organisational and supportive nature 
and less concerned with the content creation of legislation.  
6 Note that under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, policy proposals are initiated by the European Commission, 
and subsequently amended by the European Parliament and the Council. Only in the less frequent Own Initiative 
Reports may MEPs propose their own policies from the start. Under either procedure, however, choices still have 
to be made in the preparation of specific amendments and in the negotiation of compromise packages to be tabled. 
The bureaucrats involved in the preparation of these decisions will thereby face procedural and content decisions 
(e.g. when advising rapporteurs on viable compromises) via either positive or negative choice frames. This 
choice may in reality be a function of, among other aspects, the specific task, the starting position and room-for-
manoeuvre in negotiation, and the relationship between the Administrator and the other stakeholders, including 
the rapporteur. As such, our theoretical considerations arguably are applicable to decision-making processes 
under either procedure within the EP. Nonetheless, it might be that Administrators are more or less concerned 
with minimising threats under one of both procedures (e.g., because of their different legal impact). While our 
data are unfortunately unable to address this question, it constitutes an important avenue for further research. 
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with its increasing powers, the European Parliament is slowly attracting more scientific 
attention, but most of this developing literature concentrates on parliamentarians – not public 
officials (notable exceptions include Egeberg et al. 2013, 2014a, b). Our explicit focus on the 
preferences of public officials thus helps developing a clearer picture of the entire European 
legislative process. Finally, behavioural approaches and experimental methods have in recent 
years become more prominent in the political sciences (James 2011; James and Mosely 2014; 
Blom-Hansen et al. 2015; Kuehnhanss et al. 2015; Nielsen and Baekgaard 2015; George et al. 
2016; Baekgaard et al. 2017), and are increasingly being introduced to the study of public 
administrations (Andersen and Hjortskov 2016; Andersen and Moynihan 2016; 
Grimmelijkhuisen et al. 2016; Jilke et al. 2016; Geys and Sørensen 2017). However, such 
studies have thus far only considered national or sub-national levels of government, and fail to 
engage with the supranational level.  
 
Research design 
To collect the required data, an online survey-experiment was distributed via email within the 
two selected Directorates-General of the European Parliament. Information from the European 
Parliament’s 2015 budget indicates that about 40% of its staff are Administrators, while 44% 
are Assistants and 16% are temporary staff. This implies that an estimated 360 Administrators 
received our survey. We obtained 69 responses from staff reporting to have Administrator 
contracts. Based on the shares of different contract types within the European Parliament, this 
would reflect a response rate of approximately 19 percent.7 Summary statistics reflecting the 
composition of our sample are provided in table 1. For privacy reasons, we were not provided 
with any information regarding the descriptive background characteristics of the Administrators 
in the participating Directorates-General. Hence, we cannot provide a direct test of the 
                                                          
7 Note that participation in the survey was not monetised directly, but each completed survey induced a 2.50€ 
donation to charity. Participants could vote on the charity of their choice after completing the survey. 
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representativeness of our sample. It is therefore particularly important to point out that the 
demographic composition of our sample is similar to previous reports of the European 
Parliament secretariats’ composition (e.g. Egeberg et al. 2014a, b). The reported demographic 
composition in these studies closely matches our sample in terms of sex, age, education, and 
experience, which suggests little difference along these dimensions with the population of ADs 
in the selected DGs. Note, however, that compared to the selected DGs (which have the closest 
links to the political decision-making process), staff characteristics are likely to be different in 
less policy-driven DGs (e.g. due to different shares of Administrators in such DGs). 
Generalisations from the surveyed population to other DGs in the European Parliament or other 
public officials in the European Parliament may thus not be straightforward. On the political 
side of the decision-making process, for instance, other factors such as political constraints and 
bargaining may become more dominant (we return to this in our concluding discussion). 
 
TABLE 1: Demographic composition of our sample.  
 
Age n Gender % 
26-35 9 Male 63.2 
36-45 27 Female 36.8 
46-55 24   
56-65 8 Nationalities in sample n 
65 < 1  18 
    
Education n International study n 
Bachelor 2 None 16 
Master  46 Up to 1 year 22 
Professional degree 3 More than 1 year 30 
PhD 16 n/a 1 
n/a 2   
    
Field of study n Grade n 
Law 15 AD5 – AD6  12 
Economics 14 AD7 – AD8 18 
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Politics / International Relations 25 AD9 – AD11 19 
Arts 4 AD12 – AD16 13 
Physical Science 5 n/a 7 
Engineering 4   
n/a 2   
    
Years in Directorate-General   Years of work for the EU   
Mean 5.04 Mean 9.10 
Min 0 Min 0 
Max 20 Max 25 
SD 3.82 SD 7.00 
 
The central part of the survey presents respondents with up to five hypothetical, but realistic 
policy scenarios consisting of a policy issue and two policy proposals.8 The policy issues are 
based on actual policy considerations in the European institutions (sources provided in appendix 
A) and relevant to broad sections of the population: i.e. youth unemployment, renewable energy, 
transport policy, cultural and language policy, and the rehabilitation of industrial areas. By 
covering a range of different and unrelated topics, we reduce the probability that unique policy 
aspects drive our respondents’ choices across scenarios. Even so, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that particular features of the selected contexts differentiate them from other policy 
issues. With regard to testing our hypothesis, however, these topics provide an ideal basis as 
they are relevant enough to the European Parliament (otherwise no resources would have been 
spent on the studies listed in Appendix A), but not so politically entrenched as to no longer 
engender debate.  
 
                                                          
8 Initially, we included five policy scenarios. As some early respondents indicated that this made the survey overly 
demanding in light of their busy schedules, later respondents were only presented with four policy scenarios. 
Eventually, nine respondents answered five scenarios, while 60 respondents answered four scenarios. 
Comparisons across these two groups show no significant differences for our dependent and main independent 
variables. 
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The two policy proposals presented to respondents for each policy issue consist of short 
statements on five key attributes of the policy at hand. To operationalise the opportunities and 
threats embedded in the distinct policy proposals, we differentiate both proposals via the 
combination of attributes with different valences (Shafir 1993; Ganzach 1995; Meloy and Russo 
2004). In one policy proposal (henceforth, ‘impoverished’), all five attributes are formulated as 
neutrally as possible. Any outcomes are thus described as ‘average’, or are constructed not to 
provide any particular positive or negative associations. This impoverished policy option 
constitutes a ‘baseline’ reference point against which respondents will evaluate the other policy 
proposal. In the second policy proposal (henceforth, ‘enriched’), two attributes are formulated 
as very positive (reflecting the opportunities provided by this option), two are formulated as 
very negative (reflecting the threats posed by this option), and one remains neutral. A detailed 
example is provided in table 2. Note that the positive attributes in the enriched proposal provide 
reasons for choosing it, but the negative attributes correspondingly offer reasons for rejecting 
it (Shafir 1993). This is important for our purposes, because it implies that an individual’s 
relative focus on these positive/negative attributes will influence his/her final choice. We expect 
individuals’ identification with an organisation’s goals to play a key role in determining this 
relative focus. 
 
TABLE 2: Example question with policy option attributes of varying valence 
Imagine that two proposals to mitigate youth-unemployment in southern Member States have emerged. Some 
of their expected outcomes are briefly sketched below. You are part of a working group tasked with their 
evaluation. [Which one do you choose to support? / After intense discussions on both proposals, you are only 
able to concentrate on one of them. Which proposal do you NOT support further?] 
Proposal 1: 
 
(o) Fund managers have normal rapport with project 
leaders; sometimes good, sometimes bad  
 
(o) Mixed results for the effectiveness of the funds 
for the target group (i.e. young people) 
 
(o) Projects need to apply individually either to the 
national agency or the supranational organisation 
 
Proposal 2:  
 
(+) Fund managers have very good rapport with the 
project leaders, which benefits the projects 
 
(+) Very effective use of the dispersed funds for the 
target group (i.e. young people) 
 
(o) Projects need to apply individually either to the 
national agency or the supranational organisation 
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(o) Average bureaucratic costs with most funds 
remaining available for projects 
 
(o) Average progress with most help arriving at the 
projects in a reasonable amount of time 
(-) High centralised bureaucratic cost reducing the 
allocable amount for projects 
 
(-) Slow progress due to difficulties in finding good 
projects without knowledge of local conditions 
 
Notes:  In the choice frame only the first part in square brackets is presented, in the reject frame only the second 
part. Denotation of valences: (o) neutral; (+) positive; (-) negative. 
 
After reviewing them, participants are requested to make a decision between both available 
policy proposals. This decision requires them – depending on the task frame – to either select 
their preferred proposal (the choice frame) or to reject their least preferred proposal (the reject 
frame). This selection is our central dependent variable in the analysis below.  
 
Each respondent is before the start of the survey randomly assigned to one of seven versions. 
Each version contains different combinations of the frames and presents the hypothetical policy 
scenarios in a varying order to minimize ordering effects. Four versions contain only the choice 
or reject frames, and the remainder include both choice and reject frames. In total, 188 people 
opened the survey invitation (which triggered the randomization), and 102 individuals 
completed the survey. Anecdotal evidence from conversations with EP staff suggest that most 
of this drop-out was due to Assistant-level staff judging  the presented tasks not to be relevant 
to them. 69 of the completed surveys are by AD-level staff with policy competences, which are 
of central interest to our analysis. All responses submitted by Administrators are included in 
the analysis. 9  As we observe no systematic differences between their answers across the 
different survey versions, we pool the responses and include version dummies throughout the 
empirical analysis to avoid any potential bias in our results. The research design here thus 
reflects a combination of a between-subjects design (i.e. when comparing different respondents’ 
                                                          
9  Since we lost cases post-randomization, it is important to point out that this loss occurred equally across 
respondents allocated to the surveys with choice frames (31% of individuals starting the survey and 29% of 
respondents in our sample), the surveys with reject frames (28% of individuals starting the survey and 29% of 
respondents in our sample) and the surveys with both choice and reject frames (41% of individuals starting the 
survey and 43% of respondents in our sample). Hence, post-randomization drop-out did not bias the distribution 
of respondents to the frames, which is important for the validity of our inferences. 
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answers in the choice and reject frames) and a within-subjects design (i.e. when comparing the 
same respondents’ answers across choice and reject frames in the mixed-frame versions of the 
survey).  
 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of our research design and its link to our central 
hypotheses. Key variables in our theoretical argument are presented in boldface, with their 
operational variation in the empirical design indicated in parentheses. Further methodological 
information is provided in square brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Graphical representation of the theoretical argument and research design 
 
Empirical methodology 
Our empirical model to test hypothesis H1 takes the following form (with subscript i for 
individuals): 
 
Yi =  +  OrgIDi + Frame + Controlsi + εi (1) 
 
The dependent variable Yi is an indicator variable equal to 1 when individual i selects the 
enriched policy option either by actively choosing it in the choice frame or actively rejecting 
the impoverished option in the reject frame (0 otherwise). As such, our estimations use a logit 
Organisational Identity 
(scale from weak to strong) 
[observational data] 
Policy decision 
(‘enriched’ vs. ‘impoverished’) 
Selection framework 
(‘choice’ vs. ‘reject’) 
[experimental manipulation] 
H1 
H2 
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approach. Our key independent variable – OrgIDi – measures individuals’ identification with 
an organisation’s core aims and objectives, and support for H1 would be reflected in a negative 
coefficient estimate (). To operationalise individuals’ identification with the European 
Parliament’s goals, we exploit the fact that the European Parliament aspires to increasingly shift 
the locus of authority in the European Union to the supranational level. In the language of 
European integration scholars, the European Parliament – much like the European Commission 
– maintains that the European Union should be governed primarily in supranational fashion 
rather than intergovernmental fashion (as desired by the Council of the European Union) 
(Murdoch 2012; Egeberg et al. 2013, 2014a, b; Kassim et al. 2013). Hence, strong identification 
with the European Parliament’s goals would imply that respondents i) are more favourable 
towards a distribution of decision-making power favouring the EU institutions relative to 
national governments (Kassim et al. 2013; Schafer 2014; Murdoch et al. 2017), and ii) put more 
stress on EU concerns relative to national concerns in their day-to-day work (Murdoch and 
Trondal 2013; Egeberg et al. 2014a,b; Trondal et al. 2015). 
 
A first set of questions therefore enquires into respondents’ preferred distribution of decision-
making power in the European Union as an issue of sovereignty (i.e. the authority over a given 
policy) (taken from Kassim et al. 2013; Schafer 2014; Murdoch et al. 2017). EU-level decision-
making as an issue of sovereignty remains high on the political agenda (Murdoch 2012; Hobolt 
2014; Murdoch and Geys 2014), which allows operationalising to what extent someone favours 
European over national decision-making power. The question employed in the survey reads: 
‘What is your position on the distribution of authority between member states and the EU on 
public policies? Please indicate on an 11-point scale with “0” (exclusively national) to “10” 
(exclusively EU) where, in your opinion, this policy should be decided (which may, or may not, 
differ from where it currently is decided).’ This question was asked for 13 policy areas, and the 
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average response over all of them is our first measure of respondents’ identification with the 
European Parliament’s goals (EU_Power).10 
 
A second set of questions asks about the emphasis respondents feel should be put on 
‘common/overall EU concerns’ and the ‘best interests of my home country’ in their day-to-day 
work (taken from Murdoch and Trondal 2013).11 Responses are coded on a five-point scale 
with higher numbers reflecting stronger emphasis on a particular set of concerns. Clearly, social 
desirability is likely to induce our specific respondent sample to express stronger emphasis for 
EU rather than national interests. Even so, the difference between their answers on both 
questions can nonetheless provide a valid indication for respondents’ relative attachment to the 
EU versus their home country (Murdoch and Trondal 2013; Trondal et al. 2015). Consequently, 
this difference represents our second measure of respondents’ identification with the European 
Parliament’s goals (EU_Concerns). Summary statistics for our dependent variable and the 
measures for OrgIDi are provided in table 3.
12 
 
                                                          
10 The policy areas are: agriculture, energy policy, social policy, development policy, regional policy, competition 
policy, environmental policy, foreign and security policies, asylum and immigration, trade policy, police and 
judicial cooperation, education and culture policies, and transport policy. The inter-item correlation is highly 
satisfactory, as highlighted by Cronbach’s scale reliability coefficient ( = 0.853). This indicates that the 
responses for each of the items are closely aligned, which endorses our use of their average value as meaningful. 
11 The exact question reads: ‘In general, when working [with a European Commission proposal / on a proposal for 
submission to the President of the Parliament in a legislative initiative (under Article 225 TFEU)], how much 
emphasis do you think should be placed on [Best interests of my home country / Common/overall EU concerns]?’ 
12 As our measures of identification and the respondents’ choice of policy option derive from the same survey, one 
might worry that our estimate of  is affected by common source bias. There are a number of reasons, however, 
why we feel this is less critical in our setting. First, common source bias is caused by the existence of related 
measurement error in two (or more) perceptual variables derived from a common source (Favero and Bullock 
2015). Although respondents’ self-perceived identification may well be subject to measurement error, it is less 
clear why this would be the case for respondents’ policy choice. Second, the two measures of identification 
employed in our analysis made use of scales with very different properties. As this leads to varying degrees of 
measurement error, the consistency of our findings over distinct measures mitigates concerns about common 
source bias (Podsakoff et al. 2012). Finally, we calculated Harman’s single factor test for an ex-post assessment 
of common source bias. While this explorative measure is not necessarily conclusive (Podsakoff et al. 2003; 
Favero and Bullock 2015), we obtain uniqueness scores above 0.9 for all our constructs, indicating that a first-
order method factor would only explain a very small part of the variance. 
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TABLE 3: Summary statistics for dependent and main independent variables. 
 
Selected options and Frame  
Dependent variable (Yit) n Frame % 
Enriched option 113 Choice 52.3 
Impoverished option 172 Reject 47.7 
 
Identification with the organisation’s goals (OrgID) 
 
EU_Power (11-pt scale)  EU_Concerns (5-pt scale)  
Mean 6.79 Mean 2.68 
Median 6.92 Median 3.00 
Standard Deviation 1.25 Standard Deviation 1.09 
 
To assess H2, we estimate equation (2), which includes an interaction between OrgIDi and an 
indicator variable Frame. The latter is equal to 1 for selections made under the choice frame 
and 0 for selections made under the reject frame. To avoid biased inferences, we also include 
Frame as such in our model (Brambor et al. 2006).  
 
Yi =  +  OrgIDi +  Frame + Frame * OrgIDi + Controlsi + εi (2) 
 
The key parameter of interest in equation (2) is , which indicates to what extent the effect of 
identifying with the organisation’s goals differs across both frames. Support for H2 requires 
that 0, which would imply that any negative effect of identification (as predicted under H1) 
is indeed stronger when individuals reject their least preferred option (i.e. Frame = 0) rather 
than choose their most preferred option (i.e. Frame = 1).13  
 
                                                          
13 A concise overview of the hypotheses, estimation methods, and our expectations is provided in table OA.1 in 
the online appendix. Note that while our evaluation of the role of individuals’ identification with the organisation 
and its goals (H1) is arguably non-experimental (since OrgID is not – and cannot be – randomized across 
respondents), the effect of the choice frame (H2) is experimental since it builds on the random allocation of 
respondents to the seven survey versions (see above). 
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Throughout all estimations, we include control variables for each of the specific policy issues 
presented to respondents and for the version of the survey to which respondents are randomly 
allocated. These account for any possible heterogeneity in selection decisions specific to the 
policy area or survey version. Although not really required when relying on experimental data 
(assuming successful randomization), we also experimented with additional controls for 
individuals’ age, gender, nationality, educational background (i.e. highest degree, field of study 
and education abroad), grade and length of work in the European institutions as well as in the 
current position (see table 1). As there are too many nationalities with too few observations per 
country in our sample, we combine them into three different Regions: Eastern Europe, Northern 
Europe, and Central and Southern Europe. Corroborating the success of our random allocation 
of respondents, these background variables were generally statistically insignificant and were 
therefore not retained in the final model (with the sole exception of respondents’ field of study). 
Still, to illustrate that our results are not determined by the exclusion of specific controls, table 
OA.3 in the online appendix presents a set of results with the controls included. 
 
RESULTS 
Our main findings are presented in table 4. We report estimated odds-ratios, since these give a 
clearer indication of the effect sizes compared to the coefficient estimates obtained from logistic 
regression models (table OA.2 in the online appendix provides the coefficient estimates). 
Columns (1) through (3) report results using our main measure of identification with the 
European Parliament’s supranational goals, which evaluates respondents’ preferences over the 
distribution of power between the EU and member states. Columns (4) through (6) provide a 
robustness check with an alternative measure of identification, which captures the difference 
respondents assign to the importance of EU and home country concerns in the formulation of 
legislation. The results in columns (1) and (4) follow from estimating equation (1), while the 
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results in columns (2) and (5) follow from estimating equation (2). Finally, the results in 
columns (3) and (6) provide a more direct estimate of the conditional marginal effects of 
individual’s identification in the choice and reject frames, respectively. Specifically, we 
estimated: 
 
Yi = α + μ Frame +  Reject-Frame * OrgIDi + θ Choice-Frame * OrgIDi + Controlsi + εi (3) 
 
where Reject-Frame and Choice-Frame are indicator variables equal to 1 for selections made 
under, respectively, the reject frame or choice frame (0 otherwise). The coefficient estimates  
and θ reflect the effects of identifying with the European Parliament’s goals in the choice and 
reject frames, respectively. This follows Brambor et al.’s (2006, p.73) recommendation to 
document a ‘substantively meaningful description of the marginal effects of the independent 
variables and the uncertainty with which they are estimated’. Note that the unit of observation 
in our analysis is a policy decision, and that our 69 respondents face four (or five) decisions 
(which leads to n=285 in table 4). To account for the fact that answers by the same respondent 
on the various policy scenarios are not independent of each other, standard errors are clustered 
at the level of the individual respondent in all models (Wooldridge 2003). 
 
TABLE 4: Estimation results (using odds ratios) 
 EU_Power EU_Concerns 
Selection of the enriched option (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Frame 0.520 0.123 0.123 0.548 0.133** 0.133** 
 (0.232) (0.193) (0.193) (0.255) (0.116) (0.116) 
OrgIDi 0.811** 0.725**  0.835 0.592**  
 (0.085) (0.116)  (0.107) (0.135)  
OrgIDi * Frame  1.242   1.686*  
  (0.287)   (0.478)  
 OrgIDi * Reject   0.725**   0.592** 
   (0.116)   (0.135) 
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 OrgIDi * Choose   0.901   0.998 
   (0.139)   (0.153) 
Field of study dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Question dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Condition dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
n of selections made 285 285 285 285 285 285 
Pseudo-R2 .115 .095 .117 .112 .094 .121 
 
Notes:  Logistic regression models with standard errors clustered at the level of the individual respondent in 
parentheses; reported values are odds-ratios;* p < 0 .10, ** p < 0 .05, *** p < 0 .01. The dummy variable 
Frame is 0 for Reject and 1 for Choice. The Question and Condition dummies control for order- and 
question-specific effects. They are omitted from the table for clarity. EU_Power = Average across the 13 
autonomy questions; EU_Concerns = EU concerns - Home concerns questions. 
 
The results in table 4 provide substantial evidence in support of hypothesis H1. Indeed, the 
estimated odds ratio for OrgIDi is smaller than one, and statistically significantly different from 
one at conventional levels in column (1). The same is observed in column (4), although the 
estimate fails to reach statistical significance in this case. Overall, these results suggest that the 
probability of selecting the enriched option (relative to the probability of not selecting it) 
decreases by 16 to 19 percent for each unit increase in individuals’ identification with the 
European Parliament’s goals. For an arguably more accessible graphical representation of these 
results – expressed in terms of the predicted probability of selecting the enriched option – see 
the top panel of figure B.1 in the appendix. These findings are in line with our argument that 
stronger identification induces a ‘prevention focus’ in individuals’ motivational basis. Such 
identification generates a preference for the average/neutral policy proposal, and the avoidance 
of policy proposals that carry potential threats. 
 
Columns (2) and (4) indicate that the estimated odds ratio on the interaction term Frame * 
OrgIDi is larger than one – in agreement with hypothesis H2 – but remains statistically 
insignificant. This provides some initial evidence in line with the idea that the effect of 
identifying with an organisation’s core goals is stronger for a negative selection framework than 
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for a positive selection framework. Yet, the exact effects of identification in the choice and 
reject frames can be evaluated more readily based on the results in columns (3) and (6), where 
the effect of organisational identification is split by Frame.14 This shows that the effect of 
identification in the choice frame is statistically insignificant. Its effect on respondents in the 
reject frame, however, is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. It is also 
substantively large in this case. The estimated odds ratio indicates that the probability of 
selecting the enriched option in the reject frame (relative to the probability of not selecting it) 
decreases by 29 to 41 percent for each unit increase in individuals’ identification with the 
European Parliament’s goals. A graphical representation is provided in the bottom panel of 
figure B.1 in the appendix. Overall, the effect of identification appears to be contingent on the 
decision-making frame provided to respondents. This is in line with hypothesis H2, which states 
that identification with an organisation and its goals is more important under negative than 
under positive selection strategies. A higher level of identification may act as a substitute for 
the commitment felt under a positive selection strategy, encouraging the rejection of options 
perceived as carrying a threat to the organisation.15 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article provides empirical support for the idea that individuals’ identification with an 
organisation and its core aims and objectives guides their opportunity–vs.–threat focus in 
situations where distinct policy proposals are characterised by advantages and disadvantages. 
Our behavioural perspective on individual-level policy preferences advances the understanding 
of organisational decision-making in several ways. 
                                                          
14 Replicating the analysis on sub-samples split according to the administered Frame provides similar results (see 
table OA.4 in the online appendix). 
15 Note that the significance of Frame at the 95 percent level in columns (5) and (6) reflects a conditional effect 
when OrgIDi = 0. This occurs only for one respondent in our sample. Hence, for the large majority of our sample, 
Frame in itself has no statistically significant effect. 
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From a theoretical perspective, our analysis brings forward individuals’ organisational 
identification as a dispositional characteristic underlying preference-formation in an 
institutional context. Previous research has extensively documented how organisational 
identification influences, for instance, individuals’ motivation (Kramer and Brewer 1984; 
Ashforth and Mael 1989; Dutton et al. 1994) and their issue perceptions (Dutton and Penner 
1993; Gioia and Thomas 1996). We contribute to this literature by arguing that identification 
impacts individuals’ policy preferences by shifting the relative focus on the advantages and 
disadvantages of available policy options. We thereby likewise contribute to the integration of 
behavioural elements into the analysis of policy-making, which is recently receiving increased 
attention (James 2011; Andersen and Moynihan 2016; Olsen 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 
2017; Riccucci et al. 2016; Geys and Sørensen 2017). 
 
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that strategic manipulation of the 
positive/negative valence of various policy proposals under consideration, or imposing 
selection under choice/reject frames, can have an important influence already during the 
preparatory policy-making phases. Clearly, this is likely to have implications also for later 
stages in the policy design and implementation (e.g., because some options will simply no 
longer be on the table at later stages).16 Importantly, such an effect is independent of the further 
influence of similar strategic accentuation of the (dis)advantages of certain options – for 
instance, by labelling them as ‘threats’ and/or ‘opportunities’ (Dutton and Jackson 1987; Gioia 
and Thomas 1996) – at later stages of the decision-making process. As such, our results 
                                                          
16 In similar vein, Murdoch (2012, p.1022) recently argued that the “translation of ideas into drafts of legal text 
generates the ability to obtain influence” over final decisions, because it structures subsequent discussions into 
a given direction. 
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highlight the importance of carefully considering the decisions taken (and selection structures 
imposed) at different stages of a policy-making process to avoid undue sources of decision bias. 
 
Finally, we contribute to experimental work on organisational decision-making by relying on 
data obtained from actual public officials rather than students. Moreover, our policy scenarios 
derive from analyses of policy-relevant topics carried out by the European institutions rather 
than abstract situations. This more realistic approach and sample substantially benefits the 
external validity of the inferences derived in this type of experiment (Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 
2017). However, public officials may not exercise their discretion in a hypothetical policy 
scenario in the same way they would during actual policy preparations. Any generalisations 
from our hypothetical policy context to real-world behaviour thus require further validation on 
actual decision-making (see Andersen and Jakobsen 2016). Unfortunately, the time-frames 
involved in political decision-making may make it very difficult to verify the identified 
mechanisms in the real-world. Furthermore, any attempt at generalising our findings to other 
public officials in the European Parliament (who often have different roles) or to MEPs and 
other political actors, would naturally require further substantiation among these sets of actors. 
We particularly consider the extension of our analysis to MEPs (and specifically to rapporteurs) 
a very interesting avenue for future research. 
 
Another current limitation of our analysis is – although our research design incorporates 
different policy scenarios – the limited number of observations which does not allow us to 
explore potential sources of heterogeneity in the observed effects across distinct policies. Yet, 
the content of the scenario might matter. One might indeed hypothesise that individuals are 
prompted to adopt a ‘prevention focus’ particularly when the decision under consideration has 
tangible rather than intangible effects, or when the policy issue has higher salience (within the 
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European Parliament or the broader public). These potential conditioning effects of issue 
salience and tangibility constitute important avenues for further research.  
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APPENDIX B: GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
 
 
Panel I: General effect 
  
Panel II: Effects separated by selection frame 
  
FIGURE B1: Predicted probabilities of choosing the enriched option with 95% confidence 
intervals 
 
Notes: The figure presents results obtained from logistic regression models with standard errors clustered at the 
level of the individual respondent. Panel I presents the overall effect of organizational identification, while 
Panel II displays separate effects depending on the selection frame provided to respondents. In both cases, 
the graphical representation on the left-hand side is based on the regression results for EU_Power (Average 
across the 13 autonomy questions) to operationalize organizational identification, while the graphical 
representation on the right-hand side is based on the regression results for EU_Concerns (EU concerns – 
Home concerns questions). 
 
 
